Iran Strikes Spark Global Nuclear Arms Race: Will More Nations Follow Suit?

President Trump’s campaign to prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons may have the opposite effect—accelerating a worldwide nuclear arms race. The recent strikes on Iranian nuclear sites and scientists have undoubtedly slowed Tehran’s atomic ambitions in the short term, but analysts warn that if the regime survives—which all signs indicate it will—it will be even more determined to develop a nuclear deterrent. “For Iran, nuclear weapons are now the only thing that will guarantee regime survival,” says Ramesh Thakur, professor emeritus and director of the Centre for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament at the Australian National University. “So why wouldn’t they get them?” The U.S. and Israel’s attacks on Iran’s ballistic missile infrastructure have left Tehran with fewer conventional options, making a nuclear bomb “a faster route to restore deterrence for a regime that is now more radical and has been attacked twice in the midst of negotiations,” according to Jennifer Kavanagh, director of military analysis at Defense Priorities. The ripple effects extend far beyond Iran. North Korean leader Kim Jong Un seized on the strikes to justify his country’s nuclear arsenal, calling it “irreversible” and accusing the U.S. of “state-sponsored terrorism and aggression.” For rogue states, the message is clear: abandoning nuclear programs invites regime change, as seen with Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein. Europe, already rattled by Trump’s NATO criticisms and threats to seize Greenland, is now debating a new protective alliance—potentially including French and British nuclear weapons stationed in Eastern Europe or even indigenous programs in Germany or Poland. In the Middle East, U.S. allies have received a stunning wake-up call about American security guarantees after Iranian reprisals. If Tehran survives, its nuclear ambitions will likely be emboldened, prompting Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and possibly Egypt to explore their own deterrents. East Asia faces similar pressures. South Korean public support for indigenous nuclear weapons reached a record 76.2% last year amid growing anxiety about relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. “The bipartisan U.S. position through many decades has been that we can provide extended deterrence, so you don’t need nuclear weapons,” says Daniel Pinkston, an adjunct professor at Troy University in Seoul. “But this administration is not interested in any kind of security cooperation.” Japan, the only nation to suffer nuclear attacks, finds itself at a crossroads. While Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi insists on adhering to Japan’s “three non-nuclear principles,” former defense minister Taro Kono argues for an open debate on acquiring nuclear weapons. Tokyo’s civilian nuclear energy program already produces enough weapons-grade uranium and plutonium that in 2014 it agreed to ship excess material to the U.S. to mitigate proliferation risks. China has warned that Japanese nuclear weapons would “bring disaster to the world,” particularly after Takaichi suggested Japan could be drawn into any conflict over Taiwan. The proliferation threat extends even to Australia, where nuclear weapons discussions have migrated from fringe mutterings to serious discourse. While more nuclear weapons clearly increase risks of catastrophic miscalculation, some argue they could force nations to grapple with their own geopolitical realities rather than relying on security guarantees. However, if we are to embrace this new nuclear-armed world, a drastically upgraded international architecture is needed—perhaps a new Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that includes states like Pakistan and North Korea and works to monitor stocks and mitigate risks. The ultimate irony? It’s far from clear that Iran actually wanted a nuclear bomb in the first place. Tehran happily agreed to the 2015 JCPOA that lifted economic sanctions in exchange for capping enrichment at 3.67%, reducing centrifuges, and granting unprecedented IAEA inspector access—all verified until Trump pulled out. An IAEA report last year concluded it had “no credible indications of an ongoing, undeclared structured nuclear program,” while U.S. intelligence agencies agreed that “Iran is not building a nuclear weapon,” though had “undertaken activities that better position it to produce a nuclear device, if it chooses to do so.”